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In drawing on recent advances in international and comparative political economy, this paper 
argues that diverging paths of institutional development among emerging market democracies 
are driven by the Transnational Integration Regimes (TIRs), in which a country is embedded.   
As development programs, TIRs differ in their effectiveness not simply in terms of their 
incentives and largess and more in terms of their emphasis on building institutional capacities, 
empowering a variety of domestic state and non-state actors via multiplex methods of assistance 
and monitoring, and their ability to merge monitoring and learning at both the national and 
supra-national levels.  We develop a comparative framework to show these systematic 
differences through an analysis of the impact of the EU Accession Process on post-communist 
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The debate on development has recently shifted to the intersection of international and 
comparative political economy as research increasingly studies the ways in which external actors 
and regional geopolitical arrangements shape the evolution of domestic institutions in emerging 
democracies. (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson 2006, Easterly 2006, Jordana & Levi-Faur 2005, 
Orenstein et al. 2008, Pevehouse 2005. Warleigh-Lack 2006) Much of this work focuses on the 
extent to which external incentives can insulate local political actors from various domestic 
interest groups.  A traditional view emphasizes how arm‟s length incentives from political 
conditionality or from trade and capital liberalization force state and non-state actors to build the 
“right institutions.” (Mansfield & Milner 1997, Lederman et al. 2005)  Recent arguments on the 
crises in Latin America and the expansion of the European Union suggest that reforms stick in 
the most problematic cases when advanced nations impose an externally acting hierarchy on the 
inherently backward country.
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 This paper, in contrast, argues that divergent paths of domestic institutional development 
are products largely of different Transnational Integration Regimes (TIRs), in which countries 
are embedded.  Following Krasner (1982) and Ruggie (1982), we view TIRs not simply as trade 
pacts, aid projects, or harmonization systems, but rather as regimes that attempt to fuse social 
purpose and power to integrate developing countries into a transnational institutional 
arrangement that induces domestic institutional upgrading.  In acting as development programs, 
TIRs differ in the ways they translate their goals and different types of power into integration 
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 To the extent that policy anchoring, external conditionality and related penalties are defined with such precision as 
to make non-compliance nearly impossible, then hierarchical power, akin to the traditional notion of international 
hegemony, appears to be the key solution for change. One can see this in how Amsden (2007) understands the 
imposition of international economic models and when Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier (2002, 2005) describe the 
force of EU incentives. Caballero & Dornbusch (2002) proposed that the UN take over Argentina after its collapse 
in 2001and install a board of internationally known central bank governors to run economic policy.  A more robust 
agenda can be found in Barnett (2004). 
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mechanisms – namely the extent to which they emphasize institutional capacities, empower 
diverse local public and private actors, and merge monitoring and learning at both the national 
and supra-national levels.  In this view, the development problem is less about the incentives and 
largess used by external actors to impose a particular policy and more about the ways in which 
TIRs alter or reinforce existing roles of and balance of power among the state and domestic 
stakeholders to partake in new collective institutional experiments. 
 A key weakness in much of the extant literature views ideal international mechanisms as 
those that circumvent domestic politics and empower an insulated change team to impose on 
society ideal designs.  (Stark & Bruszt 1998, McDermott 2002) In contrast, our approach builds 
on the concept of the experimental regulatory state, in which public and private actors 
experiment with policies and coalitions to form complex institutions that typify modern 
regulatory capitalism. (Bruszt 2002a, Cohen & Sabel 2003, Levi-Faur 2006)  In this view, 
institution building is impeded less by state capture per se than weaknesses on the demand and 
supply sides.  Demand is impeded because potential beneficiaries within and outside the state 
lack the resources and voice in shaping existing or new institutional domains. (Jacoby 
2000,2004, Pevehouse 2005)  Supply is impeded because both state and non-state actors alone 
lack the resources, skills and knowledge needed for institutional upgrading.  
TIRs differ in their abilities to alter the status quo of the demand and supply sides of 
domestic institutional change in the ways they translate their purpose and power into integration 
mechanisms.  For instance, a reliance on arm‟s-length incentives tends to favor entrenched 
groups but provides little new resources or participatory channels for weaker groups (Collier and 
Handlin, 2005; Karl, 2008; Schneider, 2004).  An emphasis on empowering a variety of often 
minority socio-economic groups and bureaucrats through transnational horizontal ties can 
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facilitate alternative institutional experiments and create countervailing sources of power. TIRs 
can also strengthen the supply side not simply by emphasizing policy convergence but especially 
by providing material and knowledge resources to build administrative and regulative capacity at 
the national and subnational levels. Because conditionality is a multidimentional iterative 
process, TIRs also vary in their ability to adapt over time the integration mechanisms used to 
monitor criteria, deliver resources, and coordinate the two. (Sabel & Zeitlin 2007)  
 Our aim here is to identify the ways in which TIRs translate their purpose and power into 
integration mechanisms that can capture their varying impact on the institution building process 
in emerging market democracies.  We do so through a comparative analysis of the impact of EU 
Accession Process on post-communist countries and NAFTA on Mexico.
2
 This comparison helps 
control for geography, several starting conditions, access to markets and FDI from developed 
countries, and the membership of advanced countries in the TIR. Section I reveals how leading 
Latin American countries, including Mexico, lag behind several Central-East European countries 
(CEE) in terms of institutional development. In Sections II and III, we show how the 
experimentalist view of institution building helps one clarify the integration mechanisms and 
how they can vary along four dimensions of TIRs acting as development programs. In Sections 
IV and V, we compare NAFTA and the EU accession process in terms of these integration 
mechanisms and their impact on institutional development in Mexico and CEE countries, in 
general and via focused cases on the policy domain of food safety.  We argue that the EU‟s 
integration mechanisms become particularly effective as they force candidate countries to submit 
themselves to iterative external evaluation, invest in administrative upgrading, and incorporate a 
variety of public and private actors into the institution building process.  In contrast, Mexico 
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appears as a laggard because of the reliance on economic incentives and lack of 
institutionalization of learning and monitoring within the NAFTA framework.  In this sense, the 
EU‟s ongoing eastern enlargement is no longer a process of institutional harmonization but 
rather a potentially profound innovation in international development.  
I. Regional Effects -- East Europe and Latin America Compared  
“I see no grounds for the future of Bulgaria, Hungary or Poland to be different from that of 
Argentina, Brazil or Chile.” Adam Przeworski (1991, p. 23) 
 
In noting that the “East becomes South,” Adam Przeworski highlighted the similarities between 
the liberalizing countries of Latin America and the CEE, including “states weak as organizations, 
political parties and other associations that are ineffectual in representing and mobilizing, 
economies that are monopolistic, over-protected and over-regulated, agricultures that cannot feed 
their own people, public bureaucracies that are overgrown, welfare services that are fragmentary 
and rudimentary.” (Przeworski 1991, p. 24)  Given the slight advantages Latin American 
countries generally had over their CEE counterparts in terms of wealth, their experience with 
markets and democratic governance, and implementing market reforms by the early 1990s (see 
Figure 1), one might have even thought that the South would have the upper hand.
3
 
 But available institutional indicators suggest that the East, particularly those countries 
participating in the EU Accession process, has surpassed the South.   Figures 2a-c report the 
trends in key areas of institutional and regulatory quality using the World Bank governance 
indicators constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007). Figures 3a & b take selected 
countries and plot the difference in their given score from that of average in their income group, 
as defined by the World Bank.  This allows us to control for the effects of wealth endowments. 
The data reveal two notable patterns.  First, although the leading CEE countries do not 
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 WDI data show that while Mexico and Argentina had higher incomes per capita than the CEE5 for most of the 
1990s, Brazil had much high income per capita than Bulgaria and Romania. 
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have dramatic improvements, they do tend to outperform countries in their own income category 
and do not witness dramatic drops.  Some of the laggards in the region, like Slovakia, Bulgaria, 
and Romania, are trending upwards.  In contrast, Mexico declines over time and underperforms 
in its income category.  Second, the data reveal that there is a growing divergence in governance 
indicators between the countries participating in EU Accession and those from the former Soviet 
Union, toward which the second tier Latin American countries appear trending.  
Another indicator of regulatory and institutional robustness is the enforcement of rights 
for labor to organize, form associations, enter in collective dispute and make collective 
agreements. (Sunstein, 2000) Enforcement of such rights reveals the extent to which the 
strongest economic actors are politically constrained and weaker actors are empowered. Figure 4 
presents comparative data on labor rights protection compiled by Mosley and Uno (2007).
4
 
While there is a secular trend downward across all countries, the data suggest that enforcement 
of  such laws are relatively strong (and close to the EU 15 averages) in the CEE countries, but 
are relatively weak in the Latin American countries, especially Mexico.  
In sum, the data imply that there are diverging patterns of institutional development 
between those countries participating in the EU accession process and those in Latin America, 
particularly Mexico, despite similar starting points, despite more than 15 years of pursuing 
ostensibly market based reforms, and despite being associated in the two leading TIRs.  While 
we do not discount the impact of local factors per se, the divergences suggest that regional 
integration factors are shaping these trends, an argument made increasingly by specialists on 
NAFTA and EU accession. (Lederman et al. 2005; Roland 2005; Sedelmeier, 2006; Studer & 
Wise 2007) The key issue for development scholars is identifying the mechanisms of the TIRs 
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 Mosley & Uno (2007) measure 37 potential violations of personal and collective labor rights, such as the 
incapacity (or unwillingness) to uphold labor‟s right to organize, murder of trade unionists, and state state action to 
prevent collective agreements.  
7 
 
that can be broadly applied to other regions.  
II. Institution Building and the Role of TIRs 
Students of externally induced institutional change have sought to articulate the role of political-
economic incentives and asymmetric power often by searching for optimal terms of 
conditionality and their attendant enforcement mechanisms. While recent research on 
democratization acknowledges the importance a country‟s social and economic linkages with the 
developed world, it emphasizes how consolidation depends largely on external political leverage 
– the strong incentives for reforms via access or denial of key benefits from advanced countries 
or other members of the TIR. For instance, Levitsky & Way (2006) distinguish the incentive 
structures for membership in NAFTA and the EU when explaining why Slovakia has advanced 
beyond Mexico.  Pevehouse (2005) highlights the use of threats and reputational incentives by 
the MERCOSUR on Paraguay and the EU on Hungary. The Europeanization literature pushes 
further, arguing that sustained institutional change depends not simply on the arm‟s length 
incentives of EU Membership but rather meritocratic conditionality, in which the external actor 
uses clear detailed goals and builds the capacity to both assist in institution building and enforce 
compliance. (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005, Vachudova 2004) Such an emphasis on 
“committed conditionality” has also gained increasing credence in recent proposals for having 
NAFTA create the capacity to make certain resources available to Mexico contingent on meeting 
certain reform criteria. (Hufbauer & Schott 2005, Pastor 2001, Studer & Wise 2007)  
While external conditionality helps focus attention on enforcement and commitment 
problems, its reliance on arm‟s length incentives and precise policy goals tends to 
mischaracterize the processes of institution building and integration.  First, as Easterly (2006) 
has shown in his forceful critique of Western aid programs, the search for optimal conditionality 
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often assumes that external actors have ex ante sufficient information about which types of 
institutional reforms are needed and why they failed and that domestic actors have the sufficient 
resources and knowledge to enact them.  Second, the conventional use of conditionality 
construes commitment as binary and unidimentional, whereas the process of transnational 
community building is incremental, iterative and multivalent.  For instance, Vachudova (2005, 
2008) herself draws on the constructionist views of policy diffusion (Abdelal, Blyth & Parsons 
2010; Epstein 2008) in emphasizing the role of transnational horizontal professional ties between 
sub-national and non-government actors and the need for EU agencies to adapt their own 
programs and structures.  
 These two limitations are rooted in the tendency to view institutional building as a 
process in which governments can and should insulate powerful reform teams from 
particularistic interests and impose rapidly on society a well defined set of new rules and high 
powered economic incentives that would facilitate transactions and spur investment.  
(McDermott, 2002)  Whether one advocates external actors utilizing greater trade incentives, 
policy anchoring, or hierarchical conditionality, the common ground is that the further a country 
is from the ideal institutional setting, the more imperative it is for external actors to defend 
domestic actors from themselves and limit them from infecting the optimal designs.   
However, this view overlooks the burgeoning literature on experimental regulative 
capitalism, which dramatically changes one‟s understanding of the politics of the institution 
building process and, in turn, the role of external forces. Building on recent work in 
comparative economic governance and innovation systems, this literature understands modern 
societies as characterized not simply by a limited state enforcing a set of rules to constrain 
opportunism but especially by a broad constellation of state-backed institutions that enable 
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public and private actors to share risk, monitor one another, and enhance knowledge diffusion.  
(Jordana & Levi-Faur 2005, Hall & Soskice 2001, Moss 2002, Pistor 2001; Piore & Sabel 1984)  
Although sustained development is noted by the creation of state capacities, the state often ex 
ante does not have the requisite skills, knowledge, or resources, and, in turn, must coordinate 
with a variety of stakeholder groups who together have complementary resources and 
information. (Evans, 2004; McDermott 2007a,b, Rodrik 2004, Tendler 1997) 
In this view, the politics of institution building is less about the insulation of the state and 
more about the ways in which a variety of empowered public and private actors experiment with 
new roles and rules to improve their abilities to monitor and learn from one another.  (Bruszt 
2002a, Sabel 1994)  Arrested institutional development emerges from a low equilibrium trap in 
which state and non-state actors have neither the interest nor resources to explore new courses of 
experimentation.  On the demand side, groups that might have an interest in new institutional 
capacities often lack the resources and channels to gain the sustained attention of the state. 
Entrenched groups maintain the status quo not only because they profit from it but also because 
there are no encompassing structures to facilitate horizontal ties to weaker groups, which can 
open new possibilities for experimentation and extend time horizons.  (Schneider 2004, Tendler 
1997) On the supply side, states often lack the “infrastructural capacities” (Mann, 1984) for 
coordinating institutional upgrading, while many non-state actors lack the resources to undertake 
their own initiatives. (McDermott 2007b) 
But empowering a variety of relevant state and non-state actors into policy networks can 
improve the types of information and resources to be recombined and solidify “extended 
accountability.” (Stark and Bruszt 1998, Ansell 2000)  Reflecting pluralist traditions, state 
executives are constrained by a multiplicity of autonomous non-state groups competing for voice 
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and participation. (Hellman 1998, Ekiert & Hanson 2003) Reflecting the corporatist tradition, the 
state empowers relevant groups to undertake certain public responsibilities and also uses rules of 
participation to build collaborative relationships. (Streeck and Schmitter 1985) 
 In this view of institution building, TIRs influence the supply and demand problems, in 
turn the problem-solving capabilities of developing countries, in the ways they translate the 
fusion of social purpose and power into their integration mechanisms.  First, TIRs vary in their 
emphasis on administrative and institutional capacity building in the target country, and in turn, 
the provision of resources and assistance to compensate for deficiencies at the domestic level. 
Resource transfer is not simply an incentive but a strategic tool in creating governance 
foundations at different levels of society.  
Second, TIRs vary in the ways that they empower a variety of public and private actors, 
not simply via resources but particularly by enhancing their political and functional participation 
in institution building efforts.  TIRs can be more or less proactive in giving credence to relevant 
domestic stakeholders and in facilitating cross-border horizontal professional and policy 
networks. 
 Third, TIRs vary in their own ability to coordinate and adapt as they attempt to merge 
monitoring and learning at both the supra-national and national levels.  While a TIR attempts to 
accelerate compliance and learning in a certain country, the TIR itself has to build the capacity to 
learn why a country is diverging from ex ante defined path and determine the degree to which it 
must alter its own monitoring, training, and resource transfer strategies.  In turn, integration is a 
process that potentially transforms national institutional capacities as well as the existing 
transnational regulatory framework itself. (Vachudova 2008) 
III. Variation Along Four Dimensions of TIRs 
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As development programs, TIRs can be analyzed along four dimensions – breadth and 
depth, assistance, monitoring, and coordination. We now explain these dimensions and how 
they can vary according to differences in the aforementioned integration mechanisms.  We then 
illustrate these differences in discussing how the EU accession process and NAFTA vary in their 
influence on institutional development in the CEE countries and Mexico, respectively. 
Breadth refers to the different policy domains, in which the TIR requires institutional 
changes for member countries. This can be rather narrow, focusing on a few economic trade 
rules, or quite extensive, reaching into social and political domains.  Depth refers to the 
emphasis a TIR places on building institutional capacity instead of only a policy change. While 
some TIRs emphasize changes to certain laws, others emphasize the need for a constellation of 
institutions to adequately regulate the given policy domain.   
Assistance refers to the amount and type of resources, be they financial, informational, 
social or human resources, that the TIR offers a country to help build the capacities necessary to 
undertake the mission at hand. Monitoring refers to the TIR‟s capabilities to acquire and process 
two types of information – the degree to which the country is meeting the requisite institutional 
criteria or benchmarks and reasons why the country may or may not be reaching the expected 
benchmarks, be they technocratic or political. 
Both assistance and monitoring can vary according to the degree to which a TIR actively 
promotes transnational dyadic or multiplex professional ties.  Dyadic refers to a single channel of 
transmission between the principal and agent.  Different types of information and resources can 
be transmitted in a dyadic linkage but virtually all communication and decision-making lies 
between two actors, such as two governments or a multilateral agency and the target government. 
The two dimensions are multiplex when a variety of public and private actors from both sides of 
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the mission create ongoing professional relationships to shape capacity building in the target 
country. (Padgett & Ansell 1993) For instance, an original basic agreement can be dyadic, but 
then the counterparts empower different governmental and non-governmental actors to engage 
each other for an extended period in a particular policy domain.  The key structural distinction is 
that in a multiplex context there is no single gatekeeper in the developing country controlling 
resources, contacts, and information about the given policy domain.    
Coordination refers to the extent to which the TIR institutionalizes the sharing of 
information and joint problem solving among its officials across different policy domains and 
especially between those who lead the assistance and monitoring mechanisms within a given 
policy domain. For instance, even if criteria are non-negotiable and inflexible, repeated 
information from assistance and monitoring about why the country is falling short in one domain 
can force deliberations within the TIR in several directions, such as revising the sequencing of 
steps within the domain, altering the type of assistance being delivered, or targeting resources 
toward particular groups better suited to undertake the given reform. 
We argue that a TIR is more likely to induce sustained institutional development to the 
extent it a) emphasizes institutional capacity building, b) invests in multiplex assistance and 
monitoring capabilities, and c) institutionalizes coordination in such a way so as to merge 
monitoring and learning.   
IV. Comparing EU Accession and NAFTA as Development Programs 
 
The differences between NAFTA and EU Accession with respect to the less developed countries 
were not evident in the early 1990s. Although NAFTA was created in 1994 with the US-Canada 
Trade Agreement as a template, it did aim to improve Mexico‟s political, economic and social 
institutions by anchoring its compliance with new trade, investment, labor, and environmental 
13 
 
standards. (Studer & Wise 2007, Duina 2007)  Through the mid-1990s the EU member states did 
not view the integration of post-communist countries as vital nor did they envision the need for a 
new system to help these countries upgrade their institutions.  (Vachudova 2005, Jacoby 2004)  
Only after observing backsliding in the East and great variation in meeting the Copenhagen 
criteria did the EU begin adjusting its traditional approach for harmonization toward a model 
focused on developing institutional capacities in a variety of policy domains. 
EU Accession remains unparalleled in Breadth and Depth, as represented in the 31 
chapters and 80,000 pages of the acquis which each candidate country must satisfy.  Candidate 
countries had to make regulatory changes in a broad range of political, social, and economic 
domains. In doing so, they were required not only to incorporate Community legislation into 
national laws, but more importantly, “to implement it properly in the field, via the appropriate 
administrative and judicial structures set up in the Member States and respected by companies.” 
(EU Commission 2007)
5
 That is, adoption of the acquis meant building up institutional capacity 
to regulate economic activities. (Bruszt, 2002b; Orenstein et al. 2008, Vachudova 2005)  While 
compliance in all 31 chapters is a non-negotiable for full membership, it is often about phasing in 
standards and creating the institutional capacity to continue their implementation even after 
membership. 
In contrast, NAFTA for Mexico is much narrower and shallower, even in areas where 
additional measures were taken.  NAFTA focuses mainly on economic and trade policy domains, 
with some attention to the environment and labor rights, as specified in post-1994 agreements 
(the NAEEC and NAALC).  It emphasizes making laws and standards of member countries 
compatible, so as to limit discrimination against foreign products and investors. (Duina 2007, 
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Pastor 2001)  Even in areas such as agriculture and phytosanitary regulation where there are 
many regulatory and product definitions, NAFTA largely refers to standards in international 
trade agreements, such as in the WTO, as goals for harmonization, but there is no specification 
about related institutional capacity. (Bredahl & Holleran 1997) While compliance is effectively 
ex-post for Mexico, it can be an ongoing process. The NAFTA commission can authorize 
retroactive penalties, such as fines or temporary trade restrictions, for violations in trade, 
investment, and labor standards.  Moreover, because of the economic dominance of the United 
States, Mexico must effectively adapt its product standards to those of US regulatory agencies to 
gain market entry. 
Assistance in EU accession is noteworthy for its large and varied resources as well its 
multiplex channels of delivery. (Andonova 2004, Jacoby 2004, Vachudova 2005, Sabel & Zeitlin 
2007)  Pre-accession assistance to the ten new member states from the CEE during 1990-2004 
totaled about 28 Billion Euros. (EU Commission 2007)  Although programs are often criticized 
for waste and delays, observers have noted that the amounts of aid have been relatively low 
when compared to typical international aid benchmarks and to EU or beneficiary country 
government outlays. (Mayhew 1998, pp 137-42; Heil 2000)  Part of the reason appears to be the 
EU‟s use of a variety of forms of assistance, including policy networks of non-state experts for 
on-site training, and its emphasis on triggering domestic and international actors to invest in 
institution building.  For instance, as technocrats in Brussels became overwhelmed with requests, 
the EU launched the Twinnings program that teams existing and former policymakers from the 
West to work with their CEE counterparts on particular areas. There were over 500 projects 
during 1998-2002. (EU Commission DG Enlargement 2004)This approach was coupled with the 
EU‟s emphasis on strengthening the roles of social partners in domestic policy making through 
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suggested institutional models and supporting transnational professional ties between relevant 
NGOs.  The expansion of Twinnings and the decentralization of such programs as SAPARD, 
which focused on upgrading agricultural firms and rural infrastructure, were also proactive 
attempts by the EU to build a multiplex structure of assistance that reached beyond the central 
government, as CEE government and non-government actors engaged in joint problem-solving 
with a variety of counterparts from the West. (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore 2004, Bailey and 
Propris 2004)   
Assistance in NAFTA is demand driven but notoriously minimal and dyadic.  Although 
the NAFTA commission is a standing body with oversight powers, it is mainly an inter-
governmental forum.  According to Duina‟s (2007) estimates, the budget of the NAFTA for the 
Secretariat, NAALC and NAEEC is only $25 million. The only focused assistance comes in the 
domain of US-Mexican border environmental policy and related infrastructure.  Observers 
lament the paucity of financing available to meet Mexico‟s infrastructure needs. (Hufbauer & 
Schott 2005, Studer & Wise 2007)
6
  In turn, in addition to turning to the multilaterals for 
assistance, Mexico has increasingly sought direct assistance from relevant agencies in Canada 
and the US on an ad hoc basis, largely as part of inter-governmental discussions to resolve a 
particular trade problem. While cross-border multiplex ties can come from voluntary 
collaboration between relevant firms and NGOs it is not part of NAFTA‟s concerted approach, 
as it is in the EU. 
                                                 
6
 As part of the NAEEC side agreement, two NAFTA committees and the North American Development Bank 
(NADB) plan, evaluate, and study environmental infrastructure projects. While some of the 36 projects to date have 
made significant advances for Mexico, the overall program is criticized for its lack of depth and funding. As of 
2005, the NADB had about $450 Million in capital for making loans up to $2 Billion. The World Bank estimates a 
need for $25 Billion in annual infusions for ten years to modernize Mexico‟s infrastructure. (Studer & Wise 2007, 
pp 61-62, World Bank 2005) 
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The EU Accession Process is also noteworthy for its investment into robust and varied 
monitoring capabilities in order to enhance meritocracy, accountability, and efficient use of 
funds. (Sabel & Zeitlin 2007, Vachudova 2005) Besides evaluating whether a country was 
meeting the institutional criteria within a particular chapter or policy domain, EU monitoring 
focused on becoming iterative and reflexive as well as multiplex. Through the detailed Annual 
Reports on pre-accession progress and regular on-site inspections, external actors increasingly 
married accountability with problem solving. That is, evaluations were forward looking, 
emphasizing what needs to be done rather than penalizing permanently the candidate for 
previous deficiencies.  By benchmarking a country‟s progress, relative to its past and its 
neighbors, their aim was to update and modify both detailed criteria and the mode of 
implementation.  The key issue was not simply non-negotiable compliance but rather 
encouraging and shaping local solutions to generate effective institutional forms of regulatory 
screening and enforcement to meet EU standards even after gaining membership. In studies of 
compliance in domains as varied as health care, consumer protection, environmental safety, and 
regional development, scholars note how the detailed criteria varied according to context and 
sequencing was adapted to ensure that a foundation of institutional capacity was being built. 
(Andonova 2004, Jacoby 2004, Hughes et al 2004)   
As with assistance programs, monitoring became increasingly and purposefully multiplex, as 
the EU sought to ground institution building in a diverse transnational network of state and non-
state actors. For each policy domain or acquis chapter, an EU unit worked with its counterpart in 
the candidate country to collect and process relevant information.  Within each assistance 
program, outside consultants and NGOs file progress reports based on their visits and 
interactions with their counterparts. This may not be surprising, as the EU appears to have 
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established the concerted multiplex approach for many years when entering a new policy 
domain.  For instance, Tarrant and Kelemen (2007) and Sabel and Zeitlin (2007) show that in 
several domains the EU provides strong support for the creation and mobilization of relevant 
non-state organizations to act as both channels of decentralized information and coalition 
builders for the diffusion and coherence of new standards. 
In contrast, monitoring in NAFTA is largely market based and dyadic.  The NAFTA 
level inter-governmental working groups, including those of the side agreements, monitor the 
activities of member countries via annual reports to the Commission about their respective policy 
domains.  These reports largely catalogue possible areas of dispute and trade discrimination, 
including grievances from private actors, with minimal attention to problem-solving and 
identification of root causes. (Hufbauer & Schott 2005, Pastor 2001) As Duina (2007) notes, 
however, even grievance airing is limited since the procedures are cumbersome and NAFTA 
inter-governmental body seeks to prioritize sovereignty over forced harmonization.  In turn, 
national governments have the main responsibilities to monitor standards and directly resolve 
trade violations. For Mexico, this effectively means responding directly to the demands of the 
Canadian and US regulators. Indeed, Green et al. (2006), argue that on agricultural issues, the 
countries have increasingly resorted to using the WTO committees or engaging in “strategic 
bilateralism,” whereby top officials of the relevant Mexican and US agencies establish protocols 
to monitor compliance with product standards.  
 Although problematic at times, coordination in the EU Accession Process was 
increasingly robust. As suggested above, as actors attempted to improve assistance and 
monitoring, they increasingly shared information across functional and policy domains.  
Improving coordination emerged from the Commission‟s investment into a centralized, fully 
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accessible data base for all areas and the attempts by EU actors to improve programs for 
resolving persistent adjustment problems. (Vachudova 2004, Jacoby 2004, Schimmelfennig, & 
Sedelmeier 2005, Bailey and Propris 2004, Sabel and Zeitlin 2007)  The diffusion of information 
from different sources and the creation of cross functional working groups have forced 
consultants and bureaucrats to reveal their respective actions and results and subject themselves 
to scrutiny from one another as well as from the candidate countries themselves, which are 
highly sensitive from being left behind and incorrectly compared with one another.  In turn, 
programs like PHARE and Twinnings not only have been periodically revised but also 
implemented in a manner in which joint-problem solving becomes virtually indistinguishable 
from compliance detection.  Moreover, the coordination among actors helped the EU launch 
new, more focused programs, such as ISPA and SAPARD, to both relieve the administrative 
burden within existing programs and improve specialization in different policy domains. 
 Because of the limited forms of assistance and monitoring and their dyadic structures, 
coordination is not strong in NAFTA. (Hufbauer & Schott 2005, Studer & Wise 2007)  As 
exemplified in the use of strategic bilateralism, coordination largely takes place via ad hoc inter-
governmental work groups, but the work groups themselves have limited horizontal ties.  For 
instance, NAFTA‟s Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) meets just once a 
year, but is viewed as one of the more active NAFTA committees and working groups.  
Moreover, the SPS committee suspended in 2003 four working groups in such major product 
domains as dairy, fruits and vegetables, and fish. (Green et al. 2006) The NAALC provides for 
communication between national labor administrations, but this is largely ad hoc as disputes 
arise.  But triggering occurs mainly when the domestic labor unions press their NOA to look into 
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a problem on the other side of the border, which in the case of Mexico happened fourteen times 
by 2001.  (Human Rights Watch 2001) 
Table 1 summarizes the main differences between the EU accession process and NAFTA 
in terms of our four dimensions. 
Table 1. Comparing the Four Dimensions of EU Accession and NAFTA 
Dimension EU Accession NAFTA 
1. Breadth & 
Depth 
Economic, Political, Institutional - 
Wide variety of policy domains 
Focus on economic and trade policies 
Focus on administrative capacity for 
pre & post-accession compliance; 
detailed standards 
Focus on broad standards and 
harmonization; possible ex post 
sanctions; deference to national laws 
2. Assistance Large and various resources; move 
from pure demand driven to targeted 
missions, focus on institutional 
convergence. 
Limited largely to environment, weak 
resources; ad hoc requests to 
multilaterals and governments of US 
and Canada. 
Increasingly decentralized and 
multiplex, resulting in extended public 
private and transnational networks. 
Increasingly dyadic b/n govts; use of 
market and voluntary ties. 
3. 
Monitoring 
Integrated compliance and problem-
solving; regular, intense scrutiny. 
Ex-post compliance; annual 
centralized review; increase of 
bilateral negotiations. 
Increasingly multiplex, resulting in 
extended public private and 
transnational networks. 




Regular exchange of information and 
joint-problem solving; reflexive and 
adaptive. 
Commission administers; reliance on 
ad hoc bilateral work groups.   
 
 
V.  The Integration Mechanisms Shaping Domestic Institutional Change 
 
We now show how differences between the two sets of integration mechanisms embodied in the 
two TIRs shape the supply and demand sides of domestic institution building, first with a general 
overview and then with a focused comparison of food safety regulation.
7
 While the two TIRs use 
liberated markets to increase incentives of domestic actors to upgrade institutions, they vary 
                                                 
7
 We do not enter here in the discussion of variation in the effects of EU conditionality across countries or policy 
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considerably in terms of the emphasis on capacity building, decreasing the domestic costs of 
adjustment, support transnational horizontal ties, and harness the initiatives and policy 
participation of a variety of state and non-state actors.  
 On the supply side, the increased use by the EU of multiplex ties, inter-unit coordination, 
and institutional capacity benchmarks has led monitoring to be increasingly oriented to problem-
solving and relieved the EU actors from immersing themselves in local implementation details. 
The process in many ways begins with the National Accession Partnership reports, which are 
written by both EU and target country officials and detailed the progress to date in every policy 
domain as well as clarified the steps that the country was taking to fulfill the various objectives. 
The reports effectively set real time benchmarks for the candidate country that the given 
government and the EU would use to gauge commitment and new areas of focused assistance. 
(Jacoby 2004, Sabel & Zeitlin 2007)  At the EU level, inter-unit coordination becomes focused 
on evaluating the government‟s capacity to regulate a particular domain and identifying which 
types of non-EU actors, such as those linked to the Twinnings and PHARE programs, can most 
readily assist the government in improving its personnel and standards.  At the country level, 
government agencies occupy themselves with combining the resources of relevant foreign and 
domestic actors to implement the given standards. 
 In contrast, NAFTA‟s focus on open trade standards and deference to national product 
standards leave the issues of institutional capacity building to Mexican political and economic 
pressures. NAFTA committees serve largely to catalogue trade grievances and to steer the 
relevant government officials toward avoiding retaliatory trade measures.  Mexican officials then 
focus their attention on negotiating for increased market access for specific products, often 
benefiting the most powerful corporations and sectoral interest groups. (Hufbauer & Schott 2005, 
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Pastor 2001) Even when NAFTA aims to provide material assistance and coordinate activities 
between US and Mexican agencies, as in border environment programs, the focus is on common 
monitoring standards, rather than harnessing the potential capacity upgrading of government and 
non-government actors. (Studer and Wise 2007)   Such limited roles for NAFTA decrease its 
influence over time.  On the one hand, the Mexican government may not view a key regulatory 
issue as vital to reforms.  For instance, although the Technical Working Group on Pesticides 
began in 1996 to harmonize standards, Mexico only began its active participation in 2004.  On 
the other hand, bilateral coordination increases, but responds mainly to crisis.  For instance, as 
we will see below, Mexico received limited ad hoc assistance from the US in meeting certain 
food safety standards mainly after products were banned by the US agencies. But without a focus 
on building regulative capacities, trade liberalization embeds domestic struggles for institutional 
change in a competitive market environment and constrains the room for different groups trying 
to push for considerations that should count in the making of the rules of the economy. 
 On the demand side, the EU Accession process purposively attempts to expand the 
variety of public and private participants in the institution building process, and NAFTA tends to 
narrow and conserve the status of the actors relevant for a given policy domain.  NAFTA relies 
heavily on multilateral and bilateral standards to act as incentives for domestic actors to build 
their own capacities or pressure the Mexican government to offer broader institutional changes. 
Yet the tendency is for the most resource-rich and well-organized to voice and enact change. 
NAFTA offers few if any provisions to aid weaker groups and firms to either organize more 
effectively or develop new capabilities and practices.  For instance, much of the work on 
manufacturing and agriculture reveals that most upgrading depends on the strategies of large 
firms toward suppliers and work organization. (Locke & Romis, 2010, Gereffi & Lee) Most 
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sectors are too poor and fragmented to develop sectoral associations to fill this gap or pressure 
the government to provide requisite resources.  In turn, domestic firms often cannot meet 
international standards to simply hook into international value chains, let alone invest in 
capabilities to participate in more value added activities. (Lederman 2005, Pastor 2001) For 
instance, Gallagher (2007) has shown that even in Guadalajara, which received considerable 
investment from high-tech MNCs, the lack of assistance programs and regulatory institutions has 
led to weak trade associations, minimal local sourcing, high rates of exit, and severe 
environmental damage.  NAFTA does not have focused programs on building cross-border 
policy and professional networks.  The closest provisions for this are in the environmental and 
labor side agreements.  But as noted above, the evidence to date reveals that cross-border 
interactions depend largely on ad hoc initiatives on the part of Mexican groups. 
 In contrast, the integration mechanisms of the EU Accession process place strong 
emphasis on empowering a variety of domestic actors to participate in and benefit from the 
creation of new regulatory capacities and standards.   First, by focusing monitoring and 
assistance on the process of institution building, the EU effectively linked economic reforms 
with political participation and helped keep domestic voice constant. By emphasizing the roles of 
social partners and sub-national public actors, the EU helped increase the likelihood that 
governments took into account a greater diversity of interests (Börzel and Risse, 2000; 
Vachudova, 2005).  Epstein (2008) and Jacoby (2004) also have shown that in policy domains as 
diverse as agriculture and transportation, the introduction of new standards and regulations 
helped trigger the mobilization of both state and non-state actors in the institution building 
process that had previously been overlooked. Indeed, the EU has recently made explicit that a 
key lesson from problematic cases of institutional reform is the need for assistance programs to 
23 
 
support more directly a variety of domestic groups demanding improved administrative and 
regulative capacities. (EU Commission DG-General Enlargement 2007) 
 Second, assistance often focuses directly on strengthening the economic and 
organizational capacities of weaker actors to meet new standards.  As Andonova (2004) notes, 
the creation of  “enabling institutions” initiated by the domestic government with the ISPA and 
SAPARD programs helped a variety of firms to incorporate international practices and 
participate in the market, while sub-national government and non-government actors obtained 
the resources and training to implement new community standards.  
 Third, the multiplex nature of assistance and monitoring empowered previously 
marginalized or weaker economic and social groups.  Multiplex assistance and monitoring 
offered relatively weaker stakeholder groups a diverse set of resources, contacts, and 
information, which together strengthened their abilities to participate actively in institution 
building, both before and after accession.  One result of this approach has been the relatively 
strong growth in domestic and international NGOs in CEE countries relatively to Mexico.  For 
instance, according to the UIA data, between 1994 and 2004 Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia witnessed on average a three-fold increase in the participation of its 
citizens in international NGOs while Mexico saw only a 23% increase.
8
 
Several of the assistance programs have directly targeted non-state actors and aimed at 
empowering sub-national actors. For instance, Buskova and Pleines (2006) show that EU 
assistance programs aimed at domestic NGOs have helped create powerful local allies in the 
upgrading of environmental regulations. Grugel (2004) and Jacoby (2008) argue that this 
“coalitional approach” to policy change is a concerted action on the part of the EU – directly and 
                                                 
8
 The data are normalized for population sizes.  The differences in the growth rates for the absolute numbers are 
slightly less. The normalized growth rates for membership in Bulgaria and Romania for 1994-2004 were both 
around 90%.  Source: Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Organizations, various years. 
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coordinated with non-state actors – to build transnational and domestic alliances to diffuse 
standards and to reinforce the roles of different groups. The “empowered multiplexity” of the EU 
undermines notions that the accession process is namely a game of hierarchy.  The EU relies 
often on vibrant horizontal ties among state and non-state actors to improve and implement 
standards and regulations. (Sabel & Zeitlin 2007, Tarrant & Kelemen 2007)  Strengthening the 
variety of domestic “watchdogs” allows for decentralized rule enforcement and compensates for 
the limits to monitoring institutional consolidation from Brussels. (Tallberg 2002) Similarly, 
Jacoby (2004) and Andonova (2004), among others, have shown that the EU coordinates with 
transnational and domestic non-state actors to strengthen public-private networks within a target 
country and to improve all parties‟ abilities to learn and monitor one another.   
Va.  The Development of Food Safety Standards and Institutions 
 The foregoing discussion suggests that while the integration mechanisms of EU 
Accession push the institution building process in the CEE to be proactive in creating regulatory 
capacity and empowering a variety state and non-state actors, those of NAFTA push the process 
to be reactive to largely dyadic economic incentives.  These differences become readily apparent 
in the domain of food safety, despite many similarities for the two TIRs. In both cases, the less 
developed countries have legacies of weak regulatory systems and highly fragmented, poorly 
organized agriculture sectors, but became highly dependent on exporting their food products to 
the more advanced countries of the respective TIRs in the 1990s.  All the countries of the EU and 
NAFTA are also signatories of the SPS agreement of the WTO, which aims to balance the 
promotion of scientific standards for food safety, the right of importing countries to have more 
stringent standards, and the avoidance of standards becoming used as trade barriers. (Natioanl 
Research Council 2000; Ansell & Vogel 2006; Gatzweiler et al. 2002) Within such a trading 
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regime, the default development path confines diffusion to global buyers and MNCs requiring 
relatively few local suppliers to meet international standards with limited spillovers into the 
domestic institutions. (Gereffi & Lee 2009) The question is how other transnational integration 
mechanisms help to amplify the attendant institutional changes.  The combination of the EU 
preventive approach to food safety and its use of multiplex assistance appears to help the 
development of domestic state capacities as well as fortify participation of a variety of 
stakeholder groups and the organizational capacities of a variety of firms. In contrast, the 
weakening of NAFTA bodies with its initial emphasis on trade incentives has led to increased ad 
hoc crisis assistance by the US for relatively few Mexican actors, a lack of national regulatory 
and assistance infrastructure, and a political emphasis on combating standards as barriers to US 
market access.   
Food Safety for EU Accession Countries 
Following its “farm to fork” approach, the EU requires the candidate countries to undergo a 
complete systemic change in food safety from one focused from passive monitoring and 
sanctions to one focused on pro-active monitoring and prevention.  The institutional 
requirements include detailed standards about state capacities to administer, monitor and enforce 
EU food safety regulations, and the ability to design and implement policies in the area of food 
safety. While the new institutional structures of risk management are integrated into an EU-wide 
network of rapid response and risk assessment agencies, their objective is to diffuse and monitor 
industry self-inspection practices that ensure product and process standards. Companies are 
required to implement HACCP, to identify and evaluate hazards that affect product safety; to 
establish mechanisms for routine checking and control; to monitor performance; and to record 
the results of the control activities.  
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For the sake of brevity, we focus here on the Czech and Romanian cases.  By the end of the 
1990s, EU and FAO reports noted severe problems, including the lack of relevant legislation, 
weak government certification and monitoring institutions, deficient border inspection posts and 
information systems, as well as substandard practices all along the value chains.  From 1999 to 
their respective accession dates, the EU spent via their PHARE and SAPARD programs over 110 
Mill Euros in the Czech Republic and over 200 Mill Euros in Romania on strengthening both 
regulatory capacities and firm capabilities in food safety.
 9
  
In both cases, beyond requirements to pass relevant legislation, the EU focused first on 
improving the effectiveness of government agencies – including the creation of new agencies 
with greater autonomy and enhancing their horizontal coordination. Through PHARE and the 
Twinnings programs, the Czechs and Romanians improved their technological, organizational, 
and human resources to be able to track the complete value chains, monitor both products and 
processes, expand and improve their networks of laboratories, border inspection posts, and field 
inspectors.  Teams from the DGs also established a system of on-site inspections all along the 
value chain, from farms to food processing plants to border inspection posts.  As they gained 
greater confidence in the capacities of the Czech and Romanian authorities, they focused 
oversight on the practices of domestic agencies, which managed inspections and support 
programs for firms and local infrastructure, like SAPARD. By the time of EU memberships, the 
majority of Czech and Romanian food safety personnel were in their regional and county 
inspection departments and labs and a majority had at least university degrees.  (Dolezal & 
Janackova 2005, EU Comission 2009)  
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 We draw here on several sources.  The relevant EC Reports on these countries can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/external/enlarge/publi/index_en.htm .  See also, Garcia-Martinez et al. (2006), 
Gatzweiler et al. (2002), Mishev & Valcheva (2005), and Yakova (2005/06). 
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Monitoring of country progress began with the required the National Plans for Agriculture 
and Rural Development, which led national authorities not only to jump start their abilities to 
identify deficiencies and track the flow of food products but also to establish benchmarks used 
for further EU progress reports. The European Food and Veterinary Office and DG SANCO 
experts used regular visits and reports to analyze the transposition of EU standards as well as the 
enforcement and monitoring of EU standards at the levels of the state and the food business 
operators. PHARE and SAPARD Reports acted as complementary controls, focusing mostly on 
the way assistance programs could direct resources to domestic state and non-state actors to 
achieve progress in meeting EU standards and ensure that domestic agencies were adequately 
linked into the EU-wide rapid alert system.  At the same time, the EU sought to enhance 
domestic monitoring by requiring relevant sub-national actors and NGOs partake in regular 
reviews and such committees as SAPARD and the food safety coordinating commissions. 
Compliance was generally inflexible for legislation and the overall soundness of the 
regulatory architecture.  But compliance was used often to identify problems and map a plan of 
progress.  That is, the governments negotiated transition periods for such areas as certification of 
laboratories, border inspection posts and exporting firms.  In the Czech Republic, as late as 2002, 
PHARE found deficiencies in 3 border inspection posts, and immediately launched a joint 
program with the Czech authorities to improve practices.  The EU 2009 report found Romania 
had resolved over 200 institutional deficiencies that had been identified in 2006, the year of 
membership. Deficient food processing establishments were typically given three year transition 
periods to invest in the adequate systems and standards.  In the meantime, the food could be sold 
in domestic markets, given different labeling in the EU markets, and in some cases completely 
shut out of the EU markets for the suspension period.  Such a process also compelled local 
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authorities to ramp up thousands of inspections, leading to the closure of establishments – over 
900 in the Czech Republic and over 250 in the meat sector alone in Romania in 2005.
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The use of assistance programs by the EU highlights the emphasis not simply on transferring 
resources and technical knowledge but especially on empowering a diverse set of actors and 
strengthening transnational ties.  While PHARE focused on national institutions, much of its 
resources were directed to using the Twinnings program. (Bailey & Propris 2004, Papadimitriou 
& Phinnemore 2004)  For instance, from 2000 to 2003, Romania established multi-year 
Twinnings projects with their counterparts in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands to reorganize 
the ministry of agriculture, implement the rapid alert system, and upgrade the national institute 
for biological products.  PHARE also supported Czech and Romanian authorities to participate in 
EU wide food safety forums and coordinate reforms with neighboring countries.  SAPARD and 
TAIEX focused on strengthening subnational state and non-state actors.  For instance, in 
Romania SAPARD and TAIEX funded over 80 training programs of national and regional 
inspectors in 2005-2007 and the technical upgrading of 16 laboratories located in eight regions.  
SAPARD was also responsible to help national authorities establish firm level training and 
upgrading programs via local food safety inspection and extension offices and the relevant 
associations.  Prior to the accession process, neither country had an upgrading model.  Given the 
highly fragmented industry structures, with Romania being the worst case in the EU, the costs of 
implementing new standards and technologies were prohibitive for most firms.  In 2002-03 
alone, SAPARD funded over 250 projects to upgrade Czech firms and in 2005-2008 it funded 
over 450 upgrading projects in Romania.  By 2005, 100% of dairy firms and 42% of beef 
processing firms in the Czech Republic had fully implemented HACCP. (Dolezal & Janackova 
2005)  Although Romania lags other CEE countries, it still made significant strides.  For 
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  The use of multiplexity extended to domestic interest groups as well. From the beginning of 
accession, the EC partnered with the COPA-COGEC, the EU-wide umbrella chamber for 
agricultural associations, to draw their CEE counterparts into an EU professional network and 
help them reorganize to participate in government reforms, establish new local representations,   
and channel services, such as SAPARD programs, to their member firms.  (Bavorova et al 2005) 
While the PHARE program funded forums and working groups for west and east European 
associations, Twinnings subsidized bilateral partnerships between associations between two 
countries.  Today, three Czech associations and one Romanian federation are active members of 
COPA-COGEC.
12
  In both countries, the associations, including those representing consumers, 
became major conduits in producing and distributing numerous food safety guides to food 
processing firms and farms and helped organize town hall meetings on the subject. (Dolezal & 
Janckova 2005; EU Commission 2009) 
Although the EU‟s efforts appear not to have spurred relatively active roles for the 
associations in Romania, they appear to have both strengthened the organizational capabilities 
and the diversity of interests in the Czech Republic.  For instance, not only COPA-COGEC 
activities but also Twinnings partners from Austria, Germany, and Ireland helped their Czech 
counterparts build professional structures and access EU accession programs for their members.  
Moreover, these actions appear to have promoted a healthy competition of interests and an EU 
identity. (Yakova 2005/06) For instance, the Czech association, representing the largest farms, 
was an active participant in SAPARD programs and food safety policy.  After 1999, three 
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 There are 14 agricultural associations in the Czech Republic and 13 in Romania. 
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associations merged to form a stronger association of small farms.  Although this association 
broke from the industry federation, it has found role promoting and participating in EU programs 
for rural development.  In turn, as much as the agenda setting nature of EU accession awoke the 
dormant minorities, the coordinated multiplex investment into transnational, non-government 
networks empowered and upgraded the capacities of these Czech groups as well as a diversity of 
interest group representation.   
NAFTA, Mexico, and Food Safety 
NAFTA provided two major regulatory changes for Mexican food producers. (Duina 
2007, Lederman et al. 2005) First, it phased out the antiquated form of government subsidies to 
producers and formally opened trade, with a 10-15 year phase out of relevant tariffs.  Second, 
Article 722 defined a full set of international food standards, mimicking the principles of the 
GATT and the WTO, established a new committee on SPS matters, but kept regulatory authority 
largely in the hands of national actors.  Economically, these changes led to a significant rise in 
exports of produce and animal products to the US, as well as a strong and sustained growth in 
rural unemployment. (Hufbauer & Schott 2005) Institutionally, they reflect broader dimensions 
of integration we outlined earlier for NAFTA. The criteria are rather narrowly defined and 
shallow.  While agricultural reforms focus on lowering trade barriers and strengthening market 
forces, food safety focuses on the WTO‟s principles of scientific standards and equivalence (the 
use of product standards set by the importing country), without reference to support for or 
priorities in building the institutional capacity in Mexico.  Monitoring and assistance reside 
mainly at the national levels, with the SPS committee resources constrained and functioning 




 This approach has decreased the role of multi-lateral coordination and the NAFTA bodies 
while increasing the role of dyadic, inter-governmental negotiations, namely between the USDA 
and FDA, as the regulators of the largest market, and their Mexican counterparts in SENASICA. 
(Green et al 2006)  As mentioned above, the SPS committee met only once a year and even 
suspended several key working groups.  Although NAFTA promoted the creation of the non-
profit Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation (DRC) in 1999, its activities focus on 
US-Canadian commercial disputes.  Indeed, as of 2009, only 23 of the almost 1300 member 
firms are from Mexico.  Moreover, when the US suddenly issued an import alert on all Mexican 
cantaloupes in 2002, Mexico took the dispute to the WTO‟s SPS committee, not NAFTA‟s.  
Meanwhile, rather than investing in NAFTA‟s potential regulatory capacity, the US took greater 
unilateral control in defining food safety norms, exemplified in the 1997 Produce and Imported 
Food Safety Initiative, which not only increased the authority and resources of the USDA and 
FDA to monitor imported food but also, similar to the EU, placed greater emphasis on the 
importance of producers to use preventive practices like GAPs and GMPs.  Such measures 
effectively shifted the role of external administrator of assistance, monitoring, and coordination 
onto the US.  As we will now see, although this shift has led Mexico to change laws and the US 
to guide some institutional improvements, the differences between the two TIRs remain stark 
because of  reliance on economic incentives and weak support for both state and non-state actors.  
On the supply side, in response to the 1997 US initiative and increased suspension of 
import of different Mexican produce (e.g., because of microbial hazards and pestilence), the 
Mexicans mimicked the CEE countries in passing two sets of legislation between 1999 and 2001 
that aimed to bring food safety laws, their regulation, and implementation to meet US standards.  
The first legislative initiative focused on combining the participation and resources of national 
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and state level government agencies as well as some sectoral associations and institutes to 
analyze, design and implement regulatory needs and practices. The analysis revealed that as late 
as 2000, less than 53% of firms in fruits and vegetables identified the need to establish a system 
of GAPs and GMPs, 34% had the minimal infrastructure to implement these practices, and only 
11% had adapted international practices. (Avedeno et al 2006, p. 63) But the second legislation 
initiative, under a new administration, diluted resources, shifted the emphasis of food safety 
reforms to export oriented value chains, and limited the role of states and associations.  In their 
detailed analysis, Avendeno et al. (2006, p. 93) conclude that the “Master Plan” for food safety is 
“ambitious but unreachable,” with its weak attention, resources, or even legal authority for 
SENASICA to build the institutional infrastructure for certification and training at both the level 
of the regulator and the firm. Hence, without integration mechanisms that focused on capacity 
building and promote multiplex transnational ties, the supply side of domestic institutional 
development in Mexico became susceptible to changes in administrations and poorly funded. 
The demand side changes have largely been triggered by the aforementioned periodic 
health crises linked to Mexican food products and subsequent import bans by the US. The US 
agencies would collaborate with local SENASICA offices to establish systems of traceability and 
monitoring as well as initial programs to educate producers about US standards for products, 
GAPs, and GMPs.  Such interventions by the US have gradually improved food safety standards 
and monitoring systems for a few export oriented firms in specific sectors, namely avocados, 
cantaloupe, mangos, citrus, green onions, and beef.  But as much as US actions appear to mimic 
the EU approach to institution building, the continued emphasis on dyadic forms of and limited 
resources for assistance and monitoring has narrowed the participation of economic and political 
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actors and limited spillovers in standards and practices from the export value chains to the 
domestic market. 
On the one hand, the US has continued a dyadic approach to assisting Mexican 
authorities when crises occur.  At the national level, the US and Mexican agencies have 
established bi-lateral working groups that regularly exchange information on standards and 
outbreaks on specific product groups. (Green et al. 2006) At the same time, the FDA and USDA 
have established new systems of certification of producers in Mexico for a few products and 
regions in the wake of import bans, while still maintaining extensive border checks of certified 
producers. (Avendano et al 2009, Alvarez 2006, Calvin 2003, Stanford 2002)  
On the other hand, there is no systematic program by US to assist or demand 
comprehensive capacity building for either public institutions or firms in Mexico.  Only in the 
meat and dairy products does the USDA have the authority to evaluate national programs to 
determine equivalence or to visit foreign countries to verify compliance with food safety 
procedures.  In this case, there is only a ten person team conducting regular evaluations of 41 
countries.  While the team can make recommendations to e.g., Mexico, it has no competency to 
assist their counterparts in capacity building, other than refer them to USAID.  In the case of 
pestilence problems, the USDA maintains a network of paid employees – both US and Mexican 
nationals – to monitor fields and certify producers for avocados, citrus and mangos, rather than 
help the Mexicans take this responsibility themselves.   According to WTO data, from 2001 to 
2009, the US has spent only about $750,000 on training and education programs for SPS issues 
in Mexico, a pittance compared even to EU support for just Romania.
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As for non-state actors, the combination of poorly coordinated and weakly funded 
assistance programs have led the export sectors to be dominated by large domestic and foreign 
firms that already had the distribution systems and resources to organize proprietary value chains 
and invest in the needed capabilities, be they for improved efficiencies or quality control.  
Studies of products as varied as avocados, tomatoes, green onions, cantaloupes, limes, and 
mangos reveal that the fixed and variable costs of meeting the new standards reach into the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars per firm, which the producer alone must bear. (Alvarez 2006; 
Avendano et al 2006, 2009)  Small and medium size producers cannot stay in the export market. 
For instance, in their 2002-03 survey of fresh vegetable producers in three of the most export 
oriented states, Avendano et al (2009) reveal that although over 80% of respondents are aware of 
the new US standards, less than half complied with them and the vast majority were not aware of 
the Mexican government‟s food safety laws or its support programs.  In the case of cantaloupes, 
the combination of the 2001 ban by the US, the subsequent certification process, and new 
competition by other Latin American countries led to a 60% decrease in US market share in 3 
years. Although there were over 100 firms exporting cantaloupes to the US in the 1990s, by 2007 
only 13 were certified to export.  (Avendano et al 2009) Although the state of Michoacan 
accounts for 40% of the world‟s avocados, only 8% of the estimated 6000 growers were export 
certified for the US by 2001.  (Stanford 2002)  These studies conclude that ability of growers to 
build new capabilities and develop collective non-state organizations depends largely on whether 
the sector/location is highly concentrated and dominated by large producers.  As a result, the 
large majority of producers have exited the export market and turned to focusing on supplying 
the domestic market, where profits are lower and regulations weaker. 
35 
 
The ability of producers to collectively organize and access government assistance is 
constrained by the legacy of fragmented industry structures and the lack of cross-border 
collaboration with their US counterparts.  For instance, even when the US and Mexican 
authorities have established an organization for producer certification and monitoring, large 
firms tend to push their way into control.  Alvarez (2006) documents that when EMEX, an 
organization that regulated packing sheds, provided assistance to packers, and promoted 
exporters, transformed itself from a state-owned to non-state association, the 20 largest exporters 
gained majority control by requiring that voting be proportional to the number of boxes exported.  
In turn, these exporters now control the rules of certification, distribution of resources, and 
negotiations with the USDA and the SENASICA on behalf of all mango growers and packers. At 
the same time, beyond getting certified to become a global supplier, producers have few avenues 
to develop socio-professional ties with US firms.  As mentioned above, the NAFTA initiated 
non-profit DRC appears to lack an interest in gaining Mexican participants.  In some cases, US 
associations have overtly blocked channels to Mexico.  For instance, in the wake of the 
strawberry contamination in 1997, the California Strawberry Commission created a Quality 
Assurance Food Safety program, but refused to allow the Mexican producers to partake in the 
commission or program.  
 In sum, we find that the integration mechanisms of NAFTA have allowed Mexico to 
increase its sales to the US, but have not been able to induce broad based institutional upgrading 
– be it for regulation or firm support.  There were few resources provided by NAFTA or the US 
government to the Mexican government and few channels of coordination and coalition building.  
On the demand side, despite the increased intervention of the US agencies into Mexico, their 
dyadic approach and the limited assistance allowed the most entrenched, powerful actors in 
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Mexico to invest in new capabilities, develop international trade relations, and lobby government 
officials to improve their market access and regulatory needs. That is, rather than devoting 
economic, political and social capital toward creating institutions to help improve and implement 
standards, public and private actors focus discussing standards in terms of trade conflict. 
(Hufbauer & Schott 2005) 
Conclusions 
While we do not discount domestic political-economic legacies, the stark divergence in 
institutional paths between East and South, beckons a closer examination of ways in which  
transnational regional arrangements and foreign actors shape institutional development.  This 
paper has attempted to offer an alternative approach to development that combines recent 
advances in research in comparative and international political economy.  We have argued that 
the paths of institutional development for emerging market democracies are largely functions of 
the TIR, in which the country is embedded. Our comparative framework suggests that as 
development programs, TIRs differ in the ways they translate their purpose and power into 
distinct sets of integration mechanisms, rather than simply their emphasis on market incentives, 
largess, or hierarchical conditionality.  In doing so, we also aspired to introduce concepts that 
could be incorporated into development programs and TIRs beyond those affecting Mexico and 
the post-communist countries. 
We argued that the post-communist countries participating in the EU Accession Process 
have surpassed Mexico via NAFTA largely because of the ways in which the EU has 
emphasized: a) the construction of institutional capacities in a variety of policy domains, instead 
of just policy outcomes, b) the multiplex nature of assistance and monitoring, and c) the 
adaptation of coordination at the supra-national level.  The combination of these mechanisms has 
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reshaped the supply side not only by affording governments access to diverse forms of 
knowledge and material resources but also by pushing them to build multi-level state capacities 
that can resist the pressures of powerful entrenched interests and open policymaking to weaker 
groups.  They have reshaped the demand side by empowering a variety of state and non-state 
actors to participate in institutional building and recombine their resources.  This was achieved 
not only through the vertical transfer of resources and rights but also through the concerted 
creation of multiple social, economic, and political linkages among domestic and foreign state 
and non-state actors.  
The EU approach to liberalizing trade and re-embedding domestic markets in a broad 
transnational regulatory regime has strengthened domestic regulatory capacities and increased 
the opportunities for a variety of state and non-state actors at different levels of society to make 
legitimate demands for upgrading institutions and participate in rule enforcement. While the EU 
has limited capacity to monitor and enforce its regulations in dozens of regulative fields in 27 
countries, multiplex assistance and monitoring facilitated transnational public and private 
alliances among actors from the old and new member states, including them in a decentralized 
system of rule enforcement, knowledge transfer, and mobilization. (Tallberg, 2000, Bruszt and 
Vedres, 2009) In contrast, NAFTA‟s focus on a narrow set of policy goals, emphasis on arm‟s-
length incentives, and reliance on dyadic forms of assistance and monitoring tended to reinforce 
the relative power of entrenched elites in Mexico.  The result has been the somewhat conflicting 
trends of weak diffusion of regulatory capacities and standards into the domestic domain and the 
gradual, reluctant intervention by US government agencies into Mexican institutional upgrading.  
This work invites two areas of further research on externally induced institutional change 
in developing countries.  First, it invites debate about the different types of transnational 
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integration mechanisms that can shape domestic institutional development regardless of TIR or 
policy domain.  For instance, research on regulatory institutions in countries outside of strong 
TIRs can help clarify the extent to which an emphasis on capacity building and the use of 
empowered multiplexity in assistance and monitoring can reinforce aid programs to harness the 
participation and experiments of a variety of state and non-state actors.  Second, a clear issue is 
clarifying the broader political conditions that induce existing TIRs, such as NAFTA, CAFTA, 
or the Mercosur, to translate their purpose and power into the integration mechanisms that we 
outlined above.  For instance, our aforementioned analysis revealed the tensions within the 
USDA and FDA about the need to move to a proactive, comprehensive approach to institution 
building in Mexico and the limitations in their competencies to do so.  This would depend not 
only on political fights within the US but also Mexican suspicion of tying such changes to 
renegotiation of existing trade agreements. In turn, political analysis should focus less on 
conditions for a complete overhaul of NAFTA and more on the institutional experiments that are 
remaking transnational integration mechanisms in distinct policy domains.  In contrast, the recent 
opening of an independent judiciary and the imminent creation of a parliament in the Mercosur 
offers an opportunity to analyze how the strengthening of supra-national institutions impact the 







Figure 1. The South Liberalizes Faster than the East 
  
Source: Cato Economic Freedom index 
 
Figures  2a-b. Comparisons Governance and Institutional Quality, 1996-2006  
(Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007)) 
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Figure 3a.  Regulation Quality & Gov’t Effectiveness – Distance from Income Group Mean 
 
 




















































































Figure 3b.  Control of Corruption & Rule of Law – Distance from Income Group Mean 
 
 





Figure 4. Comparison of Labor Rights Institutions, 1995-2000 
 
Source: Mosley & Uno (2007) Overall points around 30 indicate the presence of public control 
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